What was the reason for the Rwandan genocide ? For the Rwandan ruling classes ? And for French imperialism ?

What was the reason for the Rwandan genocide ? For the Rwandan ruling classes ? And for French imperialism ?

A first point to note : this genocide affected one million people. It was planned for two years by the Rwandan armed forces, fascist special forces, Hutu Power (within the Rwandan state before Habyarimana’s death and forming the new genocidal government after his death), and the French state. All the "democratic" states and the "international community" knew everything and did nothing about it. There must be compelling reasons to commit such a crime so coldly. And to allow it to happen knowingly. Even if it persists in denying its responsibility, the French state is one of the most obvious perpetrators of this mass crime. It prepared, organized, trained, financed, armed, protected, and then saved the genocidaires.

First comment : the genocide has affected a million people. It has been prepared for two years by Rwandan armed forces, fascist Special Forces, Hutu power (inside the Rwandan government of Habyarimana and forming the Rwandan government after the death of Habyarimana) and French State. All "democratic" states and the "international community" knew everything and have done nothing against the genocide. They needed strong reasons to practice and coldly such a crime. And to let him consciously be done. Even if it continues to deny its responsibility, the French state is one of the most visible players in this mass murder. He has prepared, organized, trained, financed, armed, protected and saved the genocide criminals.

List of concerned French personalities accused by the Rwandan commission of inquiry for their supposed political and military responsibility in the Rwandan genocide -

List of French figures implicated in the Rwandan indictment for alleged political and military responsibility in the Rwandan genocide :
François Mitterrand

Head of French State (1982-1995)
Édouard Balladur

French Prime Minister
Alain Juppé

Minister of Foreign Affairs (1993-1995)
François Léotard

Minister of Defence (1993-1995)
Dominique de Villepin

Office of Foreign Affairs - Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hubert Védrine

Secretary-General to the Presidency
Bruno Delaye

Head of African Affairs at the
Presidency (successor to Jean-Christophe Mitterrand since 1992)
Marcel Debarge

Minister of Cooperation and Development (1992, 1993)
Jean-Christophe Mitterrand

Head of Africa Cell (1986-1992) - Head of the special African cell at the Élysée Palace for Rwanda
Paul Dijoud

Director of African and Malagasy Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Georges Martres

Ambassador of France to Rwanda (1989-1993) - Ambassador of France to Rwanda
Jean-Michel Marlaud

Ambassador of France to Rwanda (1993-1994) - Ambassador of France to Rwanda
Jean-Bernard Mérimée

French Permanent Representative to the UN Military - French Representative to the United Nations Armed Forces
Lanxade

Admiral and French Chief of Staff - Admiral and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Christian Quesnot

General and Chief of Staff to the President of the Republic - General and Representative of the Armed Forces to the Presidency of the Republic
Jean-Pierre Huchon

General and Head of Military Cooperation at the Ministry of Cooperation
Germanos

General and Vice-Head of Military Missions May 1994 - Sept. 1995 - General and Deputy Commander of Military Missions
Jean-Jacques Maurin

Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief of Defence Operations 1992 – 1994 - Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief of Military Operations
Chollet

Colonel and Chief DAMI March 1991 – Feb. 1992 - Colonel and Chief of DAMI
Didier Tauzin /alias Thibault

Colonel and Military Advisor to the French government
Canova

Colonel and Advisor of Military - Colonel and military advisor
Bernard Cussac

Colonel and French military attaché and head of the French military assistance mission to Rwanda - Chief of Military Cooperation July 1991 – April 1994
Galinié

Colonel and French military attaché and head of the French military assistance mission to Rwanda - Chief Military Cooperation August 1988 – July 1991
Jacques Rosier

Colonel and Chief of the Special Operations Command during Operation Turquoise
Gregory of Saint Quentin

Commander and Technical Advisor, Military
Michel Robardey

Major and Technical Advisor, Gendarmerie
Denis Roux

Major and Technical Advisor, Presidential Guard
Etienne Joubert

Captain and Chief DAMI December 1992 – May 1993 - Captain and Chief of DAMI
Patrice Sartre

Colonel and Chief of Operation North Turquoise
Marin Gillier

Captain and Head of the Turquoise Detachment in Gishyita
Eric de Stabenrath

Lieutenant-Colonel and Commander of Operation Turquoise at Gikongoro
Jacques Hogard

Colonel and Chief of Group Turquoise - Colonel and Group Leader of Operation Turquoise
Jean-Claude Lafourcade

General and Commander of Operation Turquoise

At the initiative of Colonel Bagosora, the Hutu fascist militias received intensive military training in late 1993 and early 1994, notably at the military camps of Bugesera, Bigogwe, and Mutara. They also received weapons—R4 rifles, Kalashnikovs, grenades, and machetes—as part of the civil self-defense program launched in 1993.

At the very heart of the genocide, between May and July 1994, a gendarmerie brigade from Kigali was made available to them for supplying them with weapons and ammunition, just like the military.

Initially, recruitment focused primarily on unemployed youth, people from the poorest segments of the urban and rural population. With the escalation of hostilities against the RPF, they were joined by Burundian refugees, as well as former soldiers, ex-convicts…

"You have to cut open the bellies of these Tutsis you’re killing so they sink and the satellites don’t see them."
French soldiers in Rwanda during the genocide (quoted by Andrew Wallis)

"We deliver ammunition to the FAR via Goma. But of course we will deny it if you quote me in the press."

Philippe Jehanne (DGSE correspondent, to historian Gérard Prunier, during the Rwandan genocide, May 19, 1994)

"We were ordered not to move, not to do anything, especially not to move, not to do anything. (...) People told us about a valley, Bisesero, where there were Tutsis armed to the teeth. One day, we disobeyed (...) the orders of our own leader (...) Commander Marin Gillier. He had forbidden us to go there." By going to Bisesero, "we discovered the truth : it’s a valley where 10,000 victims had been killed. 800 remained in a pitiful state. That’s when we realized that it wasn’t the Tutsis who were killing the Hutus, it was the Hutus who were killing the Tutsis, who were outright massacring them, every single day."

Adjutant Thierry Prungnaud (former GIGN gendarme, France Culture, April 22, 2005)

Habyarimana’s brutal dictatorship, backed by France, was finding it increasingly difficult to maintain its grip on power. Since 1990, the country’s impoverished population, from all ethnic groups, had been in revolt against the dictatorship and the poverty. In 1992, the regime was challenged by a genuine uprising in the capital, Kigali. It was also threatened by the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front), a predominantly Tutsi party supported by Uganda, with the US and the UK behind it. Forced to back down, Habyarimana agreed to share power with the leaders of the democratic mobilization. On April 6, 1994, the president’s plane was shot down. This event served as a pretext for the new Rwandan Interim Government (RIG), formed in the French embassy under the ambassador’s authority, to launch the long-planned genocide against the Tutsis. Radio Mille Collines urged Hutus to "eradicate the Tutsi cockroaches," while the army led by example, distributing machetes. Hutus who refused to participate in the massacre were murdered. More than a million Tutsis would be massacred in the following 100 days.

French imperialism, under the leadership of the "socialist" president François Mitterrand (as well as the special Elysée unit for Rwanda) and the right-wing Balladur-Léotard government, was not passive : it provided its full and complete support to Hutu extremists at several levels :

Military : before the genocide, by blocking the RPF’s advance on Kigali and teaching the art of killing to future genocidal militias ; during the genocide, by supplying weapons and communication equipment and by assisting in the ethnic sorting of victims by issuing identity cards labeled "Hutu" and "Tutsi" and subsequently during identity checks. Let us not forget that, in the years preceding the genocide, the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan army was a French officer.

Diplomatic : by welcoming members of the GIR to Paris, in the midst of the genocide, and by dissuading the UN from voting for the embargo that would have made arms sales to Rwanda illegal…

financial : throughout the genocide by advancing funds that would be used to purchase weapons

media coverage : by portraying this genocide as just another "tribal war", thanks to the zealous collaboration of the French press (notably Le Monde)

This support continued after the genocide with Operation Turquoise, a real rescue operation for the perpetrators of the genocide, disguised as a humanitarian action.

For what ?

This horrific peak represents the culmination of a policy pursued by France in its former colonies since their independence.
To ensure the plundering of raw materials and the control of entire sectors of the local economy by major French corporations (such as Bolloré, Total, Bouygues, France Telecom…), the French state does not hesitate to support the worst dictatorships, as long as they are capable of guaranteeing the smooth running of business.

The extremist Hutu regime had previously demonstrated its loyalty to French interests by covering up the illegal sale of arms and nuclear equipment to South Africa, which was then under embargo. Rwanda was intended to become a solid and secure French platform in the heart of an unreliable or largely pro-American East Africa.

Rather than see this stronghold fall under "Anglo-Saxon" influence (the RPF being suspected of being financed by the CIA), French decision-makers chose to escalate the situation by supporting the total extermination of all opponents of the regime and the Tutsi minority likely to support the RPF in its march to power. This final maneuver, however, did not prevent the GIR from being expelled from Kigali…

This genocide was not a spontaneous eruption of "human madness" ; it was the result of a strategic choice made by "our" leaders : Mitterrand and Balladur, during a period of left-right cohabitation ! This crime is still acknowledged by French politicians who, by mutual agreement, signed the Quilès report (excerpts attached) according to which France made only limited errors but was not responsible for the genocide.

Rwanda : a genocide encouraged
and covered up by France

French public opinion is beginning to be informed, ten years late, about France’s involvement in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. But this information alone is far from shedding light on all responsibilities.

French responsibilities

We now know that it was indeed the Rwandan government of the time that orchestrated the massacre, using all the resources of the state, with the aid and blessing of the French Socialist President François Mitterrand, who had close ties to the family of the Rwandan dictator, Juvénal Habyarimana. But while Mitterrand, and the special unit at the Élysée Palace that he headed, did make the key decisions, it was with the agreement of the right-wing ministers and advisors in the Balladur government, including Juppé, Léotard, and Villepin. Rwanda was not a terrible affair that spiraled out of their control, but a carefully considered decision made by the French leaders of the time. Moreover, these leaders, both right and left, still refuse to acknowledge their involvement and use diplomacy and the media to maintain a smokescreen. Trials of political, diplomatic and military representatives involved in a genocide are good for Yugoslavs, or even Rwandans themselves, but not for those of French imperialism.

They believed that a defeat of dictator Habyarimana’s regime would mean Rwanda, the gateway to wealthy Zaire, falling into the hands of the United States. To prevent this, they argued that massive French military and financial involvement was needed alongside the Rwandan government in the conflict against the armed forces of the opposition, the predominantly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which had taken refuge in Uganda. Very quickly, the French government condoned and even encouraged the Rwandan government’s tactic of using massacres of the Tutsi population to punish each RPF military advance. Thus, the RPF offensive of October 1990, repelled with the help of the French military (Operation Noroît), was followed by massacres of Tutsis in the north of the country, near Bigogwe, close to the French military camp at DAMI.

From 1990 onwards, French Lieutenant-Colonel Chollet was the de facto military leader of the Rwandan armed forces. In 1992, Paul Dijoud, the French government’s Director of African Affairs, declared to Paul Kagame (then leader of the RPF and current head of state of Rwanda) : "If you seize the country, you will not find your wives and families, because they will all have been massacred." [1] A message on behalf of President Mitterrand was sent to one of the known perpetrators of the massacres, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, leader of the CDR, who had just organized massacres in Kibuye. On February 28, 1993, the Minister of Cooperation, Marcel Debarge, officially called, on behalf of France, "for all Hutus to unite against the RPF." [2] Former Elysée Palace special agent Gérard Prunier acknowledges : "It’s a call for racial war." A week later, "Hutu Power," a united front of genocidal parties and militias, was born. Jean-Paul Gouteux [3] writes : "The Hutu Power movement is not exotic. It is Western and modern. It is not the expression of a tribal atavism rooted in deep Africa. (...) French politicians, journalists, ministers, academics, and researchers have justified French policy in Rwanda using ethnic considerations." [4]

The mechanisms of genocide

The responsibility of the French leaders is indeed overwhelming. It remains to be understood why their protégés in the Rwandan ruling class wanted this genocide and how they found hundreds of thousands of perpetrators within the population.
Between 1988 and 1991, a wave of popular movements destabilized most African regimes and even overthrew several (for example, the military dictatorship of Moussa Traoré in Mali in 1991). Rwanda, plagued by the same economic and political problems, the burden of external debt, and the weight of dictatorship, was not spared. On January 8 and 15, 1990, more than 100,000 demonstrators marched through the streets of the capital, Kigali. “At the beginning of autumn 1990, Rwanda was going through a profound crisis that was gradually engulfing the entire country,” writes Gérard Prunier.
The burning issues that fueled this mobilization were not ethnic in nature, but rather social and political concerns : the crisis, poverty, regime corruption, and dictatorship. It was corruption within the education system that ignited the powder keg. A teacher, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who would be the first person murdered at the start of the genocide, denounced the manipulation of baccalaureate results, which allowed the children of the ruling class to pass by removing the top students from the list of successful candidates. She suffered violent repression at the hands of the army, but the population rallied to her cause. The mobilization in her favor was impressive and made her one of the leaders of the democratic opposition, which aimed for the democratization of the country, including a multi-party system.

In fact, the popular uprising had an even stronger social base because the ruling class was utterly incapable of satisfying popular aspirations, struggling even to imagine how it would divide an ever-shrinking pie among competing factions from the bourgeoisie, the government, the RPF, and the opposition. Coffee and tea revenues, severely impacted by the fall in prices on world markets, experienced a worrying decline. As for the hopes raised by the development of tourism, they were abruptly dashed with the outbreak of war. In 1991, the budget deficit, which was supposed to be no more than 2.6 billion Rwandan francs, reached 10.5 billion. State spending skyrocketed : the army’s personnel, due to the war, nearly tripled.

In the two years that followed, the popular movement against the regime steadily grew. It culminated in 1992 with massive demonstrations in Kigali and other major cities. In the capital, almost half the population took to the streets, denouncing the military.

The democratic leaders of the movement were then called upon to participate in the government alongside members of the ruling class linked to the military and the far right. The "realistic" democratic opponents agreed to govern with the assassins who had already repeatedly demonstrated their capacity for harm. The opposition movement against the dictatorship included both Hutus and Tutsis. But while the military regime had temporarily backed down, sidelined the single-party system, and appointed some opponents to lead the government, this was only a temporary reprieve. Caught between the RPF abroad and the popular uprising at home, the leaders embarked on a search for a fascist-style solution.

To regain a popular base, the ruling classes turned to the marginalized in the capital and the rural poor, relying on the prejudice so frequently employed in Africa : ethnicism. Media outlets that openly called for the genocide of the Tutsis, such as Radio Mille Collines, asserted that Tutsi was synonymous with pro-RPF and claimed that if the Hutus did not kill the Tutsis, they themselves would be killed.
To bind a segment of the population to their cause, they forced them to take sides. Those who had killed would then be unable to support the RPF, which would accuse them of crimes. Hence the first massacres, beginning in 1990 and then in 1993, in which Hutus were driven to kill Tutsis. Hence also the formation of militias of impoverished people, indoctrinated and trained to kill.

The massacres

This “strategy,” largely encouraged by French political and military leaders, was adopted once President Habyarimana was forced to sign the Arusha Accords under pressure from the US. These accords, which stipulated a power-sharing arrangement between the dictatorship, the internal opposition, and the RPF, were seen by both the Rwandan ruling class and the French leadership as the end of their domination of the country. The French embassy in Rwanda stated that “the Arusha Accords are neither good nor inevitable” [5]. This was support for the most radical faction, known as the “Akazu” or Zero Clan, which, centered around the president’s wife, was preparing the genocide. The plan had been in place since 1992 (when ambassadors and UN personnel passed on the information to both Belgium and Canada), when the popular movement had become threatening. The assassination of Habyarimana, whoever committed it (Kagame is now accused of having plotted it, which may be true but does not change the infamy of those responsible for the genocide), signaled the start of the events on the evening of April 6.

The first act of the killing squads was to murder so-called "moderate" Hutus, that is, all those who, in one way or another, had opposed the dictatorship or had taken part in the revolt against poverty. The massacre then escalated into genocide within a few days, aiming for the extermination of all Tutsis as well as all Hutus who refused to participate.
In the midst of the genocide, Rwandan leaders—and not mere underlings—were officially received in Paris [6]. Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, head of the extremist Hutu party, the CDR, and of Radio Mille Collines, and Jérôme Bicamumpaka, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the genocidal, so-called interim, government, were received on April 27, 1994, at the Élysée Palace, Matignon, and the Quai d’Orsay. The massacre had been raging for 21 days. The French state continues to arm and finance them. It will maintain its support for them in the months and years to come.

It is hardly surprising, nor is it new, to see a government in a poor and underdeveloped African country resorting to the methods once used by European fascist regimes (one might even fear this could happen again in the future, in Ivory Coast for example, where the government sometimes seems to be looking in that direction). And it is no more surprising to see "democratic" France lending it its support. Once a brutal dictatorship throughout its colonial empire, France is now a supporter of dictators, often just as brutal, who in turn maintain the imperialist order.

[7] Quoted by Le Figaro on November 23, 1997 and by Patrick de Saint Exupéry in "L’inavouable"
[8] quoted by Jean-Paul Gouteux in "La nuit rwandaise"
[9] quoted by Gérard Prunier in "Rwanda, le génocide"
[10] Doctor of medical entomology, employed by the cooperation in Africa and who denounced the Rwandan genocide and French responsibility, notably in "Un génocide secret d’État" and "La nuit rwandaise"
[11] Mitterrand speaks of a "government representing in Kigali an ethnic group that is 80% majority."
[12] quoted by Jean-Paul Gouteux in "La nuit rwandaise"
[13] Quoted notably by Mehdi Ba in "Rwanda, un génocide français" and by Patrick de Saint Exupéry in "L’inavouable".

"Autopsy of a Planned Genocide"
"French Collusion in Rwanda"
by François-Xavier Verschave

"Lacking democratic authority, French policy in Africa - and in particular in Rwanda - features a plurality of actors : politicians, military, businessmen, acting for their own interests outside of any control.

For three years (1990-1993), the French army propped up the troops of a Rwandan regime—or rather, a clan—sinking into genocide, racism, and corruption. Engaged in the fight against the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (1), the "enemy" demonized as "Black Khmer," France massively equipped the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) ; it trained them in camps where torture and the massacre of civilians were practiced (in Bigogwe, for example) ; it encouraged an "anti-subversive" strategy that involved the creation of militias intoxicated by hatred, and simply intoxicated. After the publication, in February 1993, of the report of an international commission denouncing - already - "acts of genocide", the watchword, coming directly from the Elysée, did not change : "Break the back of the RPF".

A whole section of the Franco-African system defined in La Baule would then sink into extremism : sabotage of the Arusha agreements ; (possible) involvement in the attack of April 6, 1994 against the plane of President Juvénal Habyarimana (close to accepting the application of these agreements), then hosting in the premises of the French embassy in Kigali a kind of extraordinary general assembly of "Hutu power", supporters of ethnic cleansing and the massacre of the Tutsis.

After the president’s death, some of the architects of the "final solution to the Tutsi problem" were in Paris, while an "interim government" was formed under French auspices. This government continued to encourage calls for murder broadcast by Radio Libre des Mille Collines (see article on page 8). At the United Nations Security Council, France sided with this "government" and opposed the recognition of the genocide for five weeks. From April to June 1994, while the massacres continued and approximately 500,000 Tutsis were killed with machetes, a faction of the French army had only one obsession : to continue supplying and assisting the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR)—under whose protection the killers "operated." It lasted long enough to link up with Operation Turquoise : this show of force certainly protected some Tutsi survivors, but above all allowed those responsible for the genocide to find refuge in Zaire or elsewhere. Some of them, such as Mr. Jérôme Bicamumpaka, retain long-term visas that allow them to come to France regularly and maintain useful contacts there.

This brief overview shows that France’s complicity and responsibility in one of the greatest collective crimes of the end of the century were not marginal (2). How did the Republic get to this point, what decision-making system and what lack of political control could have allowed such aberrations ?

(…)

France’s presence among those responsible for the Rwandan genocide illustrates the chaotic arrangement of actors and motivations. On the decision-making side, François and Jean-Christophe Mitterrand played a major role, due to their very strong ties to the family of dictator Habyarimana. The President of the French Republic followed the evolving military situation in Rwanda with exceptional attention, even while traveling there ; during the period of cohabitation (1993-1995), he appointed his trusted advisor, General Jean-Pierre Huchon—the second-highest-ranking official in the Élysée Palace staff, deeply influenced by anti-Tutsi ideology—to head the Military Cooperation Mission on Rue Monsieur in Paris.

The government of Édouard Balladur did not thwart the tragic designs of the Élysée Palace : Franco-African policy benefits from a great deal of continuity that transcends partisan divides. Charles Pasqua shares the same approach to the problems as François Mitterrand (his son Pierre is one of the Interior Minister’s "Africa advisors"). The former Minister of Cooperation, Michel Roussin, who moved from Jacques Chirac’s service to Édouard Balladur’s, got along perfectly with the Élysée. Under these circumstances, the Prime Minister, who has little interest in the African continent, chose to let things play out. Two members of the government distinguished themselves, however : the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alain Juppé, by attempting to introduce the rationality of the Quai d’Orsay (hence the shift in France’s official attitude in mid-1993, in favor of the Arusha agreements - a shift subsequently compromised by other actors) ; and the Minister of Defense, Mr. François Léotard, by helping to confine Operation "Turquoise" to its stated objectives (far removed from the initial impulses).

President Mitterrand’s determination to fight the RPF—those "Anglophone Ugandans," the "vanguard of Tutsiland" (4)—led to the deployment in Rwanda of the largest French combat force in Africa since the Chadian crisis. Since, officially, no war was being waged, the full range of covert missions (training, guidance, advice, intelligence gathering, providing the Rwandan regime with soldiers from the French West Indies or semi-public mercenaries, and manipulating political opponents) was employed. The account of the meeting in Paris on May 9, 1994 (one month after the start of the genocide and while the massacres continued), between French General Jean-Pierre Huchon and the Rwandan Armed Forces’ emissary officer, Mr. Ephrem Rwabalinda, is revealing. Beyond the military supplies and support that France could provide, the question of the day was not how to stop the genocide, already half accomplished, but how to turn the media in favour of the side committing it (5) ?

France’s involvement in Rwanda reveals the damage that political, military, business, and even mafia-like actors (notably a Franco-Rwandan drug trafficking network) can cause in Africa when they are no longer subject to democratic authority. Some are reviving the "Fashoda syndrome," a paranoia about "Anglo-Saxon machinations" that legitimizes alliances with the Zairian dictator Mobutu and the Islamist regime in Khartoum, against Uganda and present-day Rwanda (6). Paris does not hesitate to sacrifice populations (Tutsis, Nuba, Dinka, etc.) to the defense of an imaginary Maginot Line, sheltering French trade and the Francophonie (7). This Franco-African microcosm remains linked to its local counterparts by various forms of "solidarity" : the joint management of Swiss bank accounts, funded by the embezzlement of public aid or the misappropriation of goods ; the "brotherhood in arms" with former students of French military schools, integrated into a clan-based army or presidential guard, with officers who purchase French weapons or equipment, very largely on commission...

But the horror of history isn’t made up solely of cynical decisions : it also feeds on pettiness and cowardice. Neither public opinion nor the media can truly be exonerated. They remained silent when François Mitterrand solemnly declared, "There is no ’Mr. Africa’ at the Élysée Palace." That was on July 14, 1990. Four months later, responding to a phone call from dictator Juvnal Habyarimana, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand promised him the deployment of French paratroopers...

Notes :

(1) Composed mostly of Tutsi exiles.

(2) Cf. Colette Braeckman, Rwanda : histoire d’un génocide, Fayard, Paris, 1994 ; François-Xavier Verschave, Complicité de génocide ? La politique de la France au Rwanda, La Découverte, Paris, 1994 ; "Dossier" noir de la politique africaine de la France, par la Coalition pour rendra à la raison démocratique la politique africaine de la France, trois émissions déjà parle, c/o Survie, 57, avenue du Maine, 75014 Paris.

(3) According to Jean-François Médard. Read his speech during the "indictment" of France’s African policy, on November 8 and 9, 1994 in Biarritz, reproduced in L’Afrique à Biarritz, Agir Ici et Survie, Karthala, Paris, 1995.

(4) Whose map, centered on Uganda, adorned the office of the Chief of the Defence Staff under this name. According to Antoine Glaser and Stephen Smith, L’Afrique sans Africains, Stock, Paris, 1994, pp. 184-185.

(5) During the Rwandan "flagrant offence", the French embassy paid much more attention to safeguarding its archives than to the massacre of Rwandan cooperation staff.

(6) Until the "complete transformation of our policy in Rwanda" announced by Minister Bernard Debré in Le Monde, December 29, 1994 : the old one was indefensible within the framework of the French presidency of the European Union.

(7) But, observes Colette Braeckman, "can we seriously imagine that the defense of the French language could coincide with the protection of a regime worthy of the Nazis ? No Toubon law will ever be able to repair such an outrage to the very spirit of the French language."

Chronology

1973 : Habyarimana seizes power in a bloody coup.
1990s : Social revolt against poverty and political revolt against the dictatorship, with massive demonstrations in Kigali (100,000 on January 8, 1990, and again on January 15).

April 1990 : Rwandan Head of State Mr. Juvenal Habyarimana completed an official visit to France on Friday, April 6, during which he met with Mr. Mitterrand.

June 20, 1990 : Mitterrand’s speech in favor of multiparty politics at the Franco-African summit in La Baule.

Late 1990 : Lieutenant-Colonel Chollet, of the French army, organizes the Rwandan army and Paul Barril works for the Akazu, the presidential family clan.

October 1990 : On October 17, Zaire withdrew its troops from Rwanda, where they had been supporting the regime. On October 18, 1990, dictator Juvenal Habyarimana, visiting the Élysée Palace, received a promise of French military aid from President François Mitterrand in exchange for a promise of political openness to the opposition. Operation Noroit : French involvement in the war against the RPF under the pretext of assisting in the evacuation of French citizens. The French contingent halted the RPF offensive at the gates of Kigali for the first time, then helped the government arrest its opponents in the capital. The government accused the entire Tutsi community of complicity with the RPF armed forces, which were attacking the government from Uganda. 4,000 Rwandan Tutsis, labeled "suspects" of sympathizing with the RPF, were arrested without trial. "We must unmask the assailants who have infiltrated the population as quickly as possible," declared the president, explaining the nationwide denunciation campaign to which Rwandans are now being invited. This presents a golden opportunity for both authorities and private citizens to get rid of a neighbor, a coworker, or an opponent. A simple phone call is all it takes ; the military arrives minutes later, takes the suspect into custody, and postpones identity checks. A stadium had to be opened for several days to accommodate the overflow of detainees.
November 1990 : "We are ready to provide financial assistance to help you resolve the refugee problem," declared the French Minister of Cooperation, Jacques Pelletier, on Thursday, November 8, following a mission to the region.

December 1990 : In its December issue, the newly launched bi-monthly magazine Kangura (close to the Rwandan army leadership) laid out "the ten commandments" that the Hutus (the majority ethnic group, in power since 1959) were expected to follow. Any Hutu citizen "who allies himself with the Tutsis in his business dealings" would be considered a "traitor." Worse still : "Hutus must cease to have pity on the Tutsis" and, allying themselves with "their Bantu brothers," be "firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy." This call to racial hatred does not seem to have moved President Habyarimana’s government, nor the judicial institutions, which are usually quick to react whenever "suspects" of Tutsi origin are involved.

June 1991 : The introduction of a multi-party system led to the creation of a dozen official parties and some sixty private newspapers. In reality, parties, associations, and newspapers critical of the regime were constantly harassed and attacked, while the Hutu far-right press and organizations were favored by the government. However, the opposition members of the MDR, PL, and PSD cultivated realism and moderation, refusing to rely on popular revolt.
November 1991 : A massive demonstration against the dictatorship took place in Kigali on Sunday, November 24. The president was forced to concede to the multi-party system. On November 1, 1990, Belgian troops withdrew and were replaced by French troops.

January 1992 : "On January 8, 1992, demonstrations of unprecedented scale in Rwanda shook the country’s main cities, notably Butare, Gitarama, and especially Kigali, where 50,000 people marched to protest against the new government. Another day of demonstrations was called for January 15, but the authorities banned it, and demonstrators who defied the ban were arrested." (Quilès report)

February 1992 : Pro-French journalist Simon Catherine writes : “The French military isn’t fighting directly, but it’s true that they provide added value to the Rwandan army.” Paradoxically, this French presence is both criticized by the opposition and praised as a kind of “guarantee” given to the democratization process. Even those who oppose it admitted, until recently, that it had helped prevent “major blunders on the humanitarian front.” The French media are adept at endorsing, in the name of humanitarianism, the atrocities supported by France in Rwanda.

March 1992 : Massacres orchestrated by the government in the southeast of the country, a rehearsal for what would become the genocide. In the Bugesera region, 13,000 inhabitants were forced to flee the massacres of Tutsis by Hutus, massacres organized almost openly by the government. Burned houses, rape, and serious injuries were also methods used in a mass terror that, for the moment, remained localized. The Hutu fascist movement thus attempted to provide an outlet for popular discontent. Alphonse Mobito of the Rwandan Association for Human Rights stated that hundreds of people "were burned or thrown into cesspools." A leaflet with violently tribalist overtones, read on March 3 on national radio, was "partly" responsible for the tragedy, Prime Minister Sylvestre Nsanzimana acknowledged on Monday, March 9, in an interview with Radio France Internationale (RFI). In addition to the radio, we must mention as an openly genocidal and pro-government media the newspaper "Kangura", which regularly calls for the "salvation of the Bantu people" and denounces, at length, the "crusade" of the Tutsis - these "venomous snakes", who have "sold their viper-daughters to the Americans, the Europeans, and even the Africans" - and which, despite its calls for the murder of the Tutsis, has never been bothered.

March 14, 1992 : The democratic opposition cancels the planned protest against the massacres due to its negotiations with the government, an agreement which stipulates that the Rwandan Prime Minister will be chosen by the opposition.

Early March 1992 : France sends new troops from the 2nd Marine Infantry Regiment.

April 16, 1992 : The government is forced to establish a government of political parties, including the democratic opposition, whose leader of the MDR, Nsengiyaremye, is appointed head of government.

July 1992 : According to Mr. Habyarimana, interviewed by Radio France Internationale, France is in Rwanda to protect its interests, without further details (RFI, July 19, 1992).

August 1992 : On August 26, 1992, an amendment to the French military assistance agreement with Rwanda was signed : Ambassador Georges Martres simply stated that he “had realized in 1992 that the military cooperation intended for the Rwandan army lacked a legal basis since the agreement in force at that time only mentioned cooperation with the Gendarmerie”.

September 1, 1992 : Official letter from President François Mitterrand thanking Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, fascist leader of the CDR who had just organized massacres in Kibuye to torpedo the agreements.

November 1992 : violence by the fascist Hutu Interahamwe gangs increases.

February 28, 1993 : The Minister of Cooperation, Marcel Debarge, visiting Kigali, calls on all Hutus to unite against the RPF. According to Gérard Prunier, a former Africa specialist at the Élysée Palace, this is "a call for racial war" (in Rwanda, the Genocide). A week later, the "Hutu Power" front is founded.

Aid to the Rwandan army officially amounted to 12 million francs worth of equipment in 1993, and the secondment of a few dozen instructors had never ceased, accompanying the "rise to power" of these troops : in five years, its numbers had increased from 15,000 to 40,000 men, while the guerrilla itself was strengthening (See Philippe Leymarie, "France and the maintenance of order in Africa", Le Monde diplomatique, June 1994).

July 17, 1993 : formation of a new government with Agathe Uwilingiyimana as prime minister.

August 4, 1993 : The Arusha Accords are signed by the Rwandan president and the RPF, with a view to sharing power and ending the war, accords signed under American pressure.

January 1994 : France participated in supplying weapons used in the massacres : the Human Rights Watch report of January 1994 highlights that mortars, armored vehicles, artillery pieces, and helicopters were delivered to Rwanda. Military advisors and up to 680 military personnel were present in Rwanda, officially to protect expatriates, but in reality to contain the advance of the Patriotic Front. Furthermore, a sale of Egyptian arms, worth $6 million, was guaranteed by Crédit Lyonnais.

Until April 1994 : French military operation "Amaryllis" which evacuated all the Whites and some bigwigs of the Hutu fascists.

From January 1993 to March 1994 : the regime purchased the bulk of the machetes used in the genocide ; 581 tons, or one machete for every three Hutu adults

April 6, 1994 : This marks the beginning of the genocide triggered by the news of the president’s death, his plane having been shot down. The presidential guard (whose leadership was trained in France) began assassinating the political opposition and moderate Hutus. Then, the Interahamwe militia, affiliated with the MRND (the former single party and Christian Democratic International), set up roadblocks where Tutsis were systematically killed. The army and the militias then forced the Hutu population to kill Tutsis.

July 1994 : Operation Turquoise

Historical

The 1990-92 revolt

The pretext used by the ruling classes and French imperialism was to claim that the war was merely a defense against an external attack by a foreign-funded and supported army. It is unclear why an external military attack would justify a violent internal aggression against half the civilian population, who had in no way taken sides in this war. The fact that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an organized and armed opposition based in Uganda, launched its first attack on October 1, 1990, was not a coincidence. 1990 was a pivotal year for all of Africa. Indeed, that year, due to the economic crisis of the capitalist system into which the world had been inexorably sinking for over twenty years, the entire African continent was caught in a turmoil of unprecedented social struggles. More than any other region in the world, Africa, more vulnerable because it had been exploited for centuries, was suffering the painful consequences of the crisis. Due to the fall in commodity prices on the world market, the living conditions of the masses had deteriorated profoundly, essentially because, on the one hand, with increasingly empty coffers, states no longer had the means to provide necessary public services and increase wages, and on the other hand, because, under pressure from the IMF and respecting its structural adjustment programs, these same states were freezing wages, reducing student grants and organizing mass layoffs, both in the public and private sectors, by enacting laws allowing employers to do as they pleased.

All these attacks by the global bourgeoisie, carried out through the policies of its local lackeys, eventually triggered the anger of various segments of the African population. This anger manifested itself in different ways : food riots following increases in the price of bread, as in Morocco and Tunisia, but above all, strikes and revolts. The entire African continent was shaken. In Abidjan, Douala, Lomé, Libreville, Bamako, Kinshasa, and many other African capitals, thousands of people—workers, students, women, and young people—rose up to say they would no longer accept living as before. They took to the streets to voice their anger against poverty. They protested against the IMF’s structural adjustment programs, demanding an end to layoffs, higher wages, increased scholarships, and improved educational conditions. These strikes, riots, and revolts would shake the dictatorships, cause some to retreat or even bring down others, as in Mali, for example, in 1991.

This unprecedented surge of events, some of which, like the youth uprising in Algeria in 1988, had begun years before 1990, forced French imperialism to pressure its local lackeys to slightly alter the facade of their dictatorial regimes. Thus, many dictators who had previously sworn that they would never establish a multi-party system during their lifetimes would ultimately back down and accept the existence of parties other than their own. To complete the picture, it was during this same period that, under pressure from the imperialist powers, in South Africa, alarmed by the almost constant explosion of townships and ghettos, the white bourgeoisie decided to meet with the leadership of the ANC in Lusaka, Zambia, to discuss the prospect of a smooth transition away from apartheid through a negotiated solution with the black bourgeoisie. Here and there, the aim of all these operations was obviously to try to defuse the anger of the popular masses, to domesticate it, by diverting it towards formal changes in order to prevent it from leading to a contagious questioning of the social order.

Rwanda, too, had experienced the same problems as other African countries. The fall in commodity prices had created enormous difficulties for the country : between 1985 and 1988, the price of coffee had fallen by 30%, and that of tea by 40%. The price of tin had also plummeted to such an extent that, in 1985, Somirwa, a mining company whose tin operations provided the state with 25% of its foreign exchange earnings and which employed 8,000 people, went bankrupt. Consequently, the masses faced the same problems as elsewhere : precariousness, poverty, layoffs, followed by profound discontent.

From 1989 onward, the one-party regime faced increasing criticism, including from within. That same year, thirty-three intellectuals dared to publish an open letter demanding free elections. In 1990, under pressure from the public and French imperialism, like other dictators, Habyarimana agreed to establish a national commission to implement a multi-party system. But before the commission could submit its findings, several opposition political groups, independent trade unions, human rights organizations, and a diverse, independent press emerged.

Opposite the former single party, the MRND (National Revolutionary Movement for Development), which changed its name to the MRNDD (National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development), a whole series of bourgeois political parties emerged, ranging from moderate liberals to openly racist, anti-Tutsi parties. The most important of these was the MDR (Democratic Republican Movement). Led by Hutus rivals of Habyarimana, originating from the Central and Southern regions, this party presented itself as the heir to the Parmehutu of the former dictator Kayibanda.

Many of these parties, if not most, were offshoots of the MNRD, the dictatorship’s party. Their primary ambition was to share power with the "Akazu" clique, the dictator’s inner circle. Furthermore, although they generally defined themselves as Hutu or Tutsi, these parties were often organized around the personal ambitions of a few individuals and appeared to represent the interests of a particular region rather than a specific ethnic community. For example, the MDR, which emerged from the MNRD and was led by Hutus, claimed to defend the interests of the Hutus of the central and southern regions who had been excluded from governing since the Hutus of the north seized power. The same was true for all the other parties. Therefore, accusing the party of dictator Habyarimana of concentrating power exclusively in the hands of the Hutus of the North, the sole ambition of all these parties was to put pressure on the dictatorship in order to achieve a redistribution of power in the form of a rebalancing in favor of both sides.

In any case, Habyarimana’s dictatorship was shaken by this situation. It was weakened by the growing protest movement in the country. Above all, it had lost the confidence of a segment of its petty-bourgeois base. And it was in this context that the RPF’s first attack occurred.

The major powers aimed for a power-sharing agreement with the RPF.
Adding to the growing internal protest movement and the pressure from wealthy countries seeking political stability, this attack placed Habyarimana’s dictatorship under triple pressure. The convergence of these three elements—street demonstrations, pressure from imperialist powers, and RPF raids—in a context marked by enormous economic difficulties due to falling commodity prices, weighed even more heavily on the regime, forcing it to compromise with the opposition and agree to negotiate. Thus, in March 1992 and June 1993, a transitional government was formed with the opposition parties. In August 1992, discussions and negotiations began between the Habyarimana dictatorship and the entire opposition, both political and military, which would last several months before resulting in a set of agreements called "the Arusha Accords", named after a Tanzanian city where they were concluded in August 1993.

On paper, these agreements stipulated that the head of state would no longer rule. Real power would lie in the hands of political parties, supported by a sovereign National Assembly, with a broad-based transitional government. Among other things, these agreements also included the end of the war, reconciliation, the establishment of the rule of law, the return of exiles scattered around the world, and the sharing of power between the former single party, opposition parties, and the RPF. The RPF would transform into a political party, and its members would be integrated into the army. Finally, presidential and legislative elections were to be held in 1995.

The imperialist powers and opposition parties alike believed they held the key to the Rwandan crisis in these agreements. They thought that simply putting a few generous ideas about peace, the rule of law, and so on down on paper would be enough to convince Habyarimana and his Akazu clan to accept everything, even relinquishing their privileges. But they hadn’t reckoned with the dictatorship’s dignitaries, who only pretended to accept the compromise. At a rally in 1992, Habyarimana dismissed the Arusha negotiations as "a mere scrap of paper." He and his cronies were using the negotiations primarily as a cover to better prepare for war. For them, the idea of ​​a simple power-sharing agreement was unacceptable, a threat to their interests. In this time of crisis, when the spoils of power had shrunk due to the collapse of export revenues, the greed of the small minority close to the regime grew accordingly. The regime’s dignitaries clung desperately to their positions, the primary source of their wealth, as did the businessmen who had prospered under the single-party system. The army chiefs and other military personnel feared competition from their rivals in the RPF and the prospect of demobilization that would lead to unemployment. Consequently, all these people, along with countless other profiteers of the Habyarimana system, wanted no compromise whatsoever with their opposition rivals. So, using the state apparatus, they would unite, forming a bloc to oppose the prospect of power-sharing by any means necessary and, to defend their privileges, opt for a methodically planned genocide.

The rise of fascism

Thus, from the very first RPF attack in October 1990, the regime’s top officials reacted brutally. As in the darkest days of Habyarimana’s dictatorship, they raised the specter of the "enemy within" and made no secret of their intention to retaliate : within hours, 10,000 people, mostly Tutsis but also moderate Hutus considered allies of the RPF, were arrested and herded into Kigali’s stadium. In the provinces, authorities, mayors, prefects, and zone commanders incited Hutus to attack their Tutsi neighbors : in the prefecture of Gisenyi, for example, 300 Tutsis were killed, thousands more were wounded or forced to flee, their houses burned, and their property looted. Other massacres of this kind took place elsewhere. In 1991, following another RPF attack in Ruhengeri, Hutus, under the direction of the police, the army, and local high-ranking officials, massacred 300 people from a Tutsi pastoralist community. Prior to this massacre, a leaflet, signed by the prefect and the Minister of the Interior, had circulated, calling on farmers to destroy "the bushes and all the rebels hiding there. And above all, don’t forget," the leaflet said, "that he who cuts a weed must also destroy its roots." In 1992, during a meeting held in Gisenyi, a certain Léon Mugeséra, vice-president of the MRND, the dictatorship’s party, declared : "I urge all important figures in the MRND to collaborate. Whoever heads the Public Treasury, let him bring us the money... The businessman must touch his coffers and bring us money so that we can go and cut off the heads of these bastards. Remember that our movement has its roots in the cells and sectors. The president told you that a tree with branches and leaves only, but no roots, is a dead tree. Our cell leaders must get to work, even if they are not paid. Any element outside the cell must be noted. If it is an accomplice of the Inyenzis (Tutsis), he must perish without further ado... Our mistake in 1959 was that I was a child, that we... left to leave safe and sound... I repeat that we must quickly get to work... Know that the one whose head you have not cut off will be the one to cut off yours." In fact, from 1990 onwards, it was openly, in full view of everyone, that Rwandan dignitaries, using the totalitarian state framework, psychologically prepared the population for future massacres through propaganda based on the threat of the Tutsis.

For four years, this type of discourse, fueled by hatred of Tutsis in general, was disseminated not only by regime dignitaries but also disseminated and relayed by the media, notably first on national radio and then on the so-called free radio station Radio Mille Collines, and in the pages of a newspaper called Kangura. In 1990, for example, in an edition of Kangura where the entire front page featured a photo of Mitterrand with the caption "A true friend of Rwanda," an article entitled "The Ten Commandments of the Muhutu" was published. This text read : "Every Hutu must know that every Tutsi woman, wherever she may be, works for her Tutsi ethnic group. Therefore, any Hutu who marries a Tutsi, who makes a Tutsi his concubine, who makes a Tutsi his secretary or his protégée is a traitor. Every Hutu must know that every Tutsi is dishonest in business. He aims only for the supremacy of his ethnic group. Therefore, any Hutu who allies himself with Tutsis in business, who invests his own money or state money in a Tutsi-owned enterprise, is a traitor... Hutus must stop feeling sorry for Tutsis... Every Hutu must widely disseminate this ideology..."

The objective of all this anti-Tutsi propaganda was to rally the Hutu community around the Akazu clan in the name of Hutu nationalism, by making Hutus, especially the privileged members of this community—particularly businessmen and intellectuals who had joined the moderate Hutu opposition—believe that they risked losing everything by accepting any compromise with the RPF, presented as the armed wing of the Tutsis. Thus, within all the opposition parties, circles and groups led by intellectuals would form and rally to Habyarimana’s dictatorship, creating what they called "Hutu Power," a kind of broad, top-down, fascist political framework designed to defend the interests of the privileged members of this community.

To rebuild their popular base, which had eroded since the country’s impoverishment and the introduction of multiparty politics, those in power did not only exploit the specter of the Tutsi threat. They also used other means, such as corruption. It was through bribery that they won over certain leaders of opposing parties. This is how the main opposition party, the MDR, split in two : on one side, a faction determined to see the compromise with the RPF through to the end, and on the other, another that joined the Akazu camp in the name of defending Hutu interests. The Liberal Party, which was unique in having Tutsis among its members and even being led by a Tutsi president, also splintered into two factions, one Tutsi, the other Hutu and sympathetic to the ideas of Hutu Power.

And when corruption wasn’t enough, assassinations were resorted to, and they multiplied : because he refused to align himself with Hutu power, Félicien Gatabazi, the Hutu leader of the Social Democratic Party, was assassinated in February 1994. To strengthen its base, the regime also encouraged the creation of several satellite parties, such as the People’s Party, led by a wealthy woman, but especially the CDR, the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic, an organization formed to the right of the MRND. This latter group was made up of hardline Hutu activists from the central and southern regions, loyal to the former dictator Kayibanda. They considered themselves more extremist than the Akazu clique and refused any compromise with the RPF.

Thus, while participating in negotiations with the opposition parties and the RPF, Habyarimana and his supporters gathered around them a segment of the Hutu elite, thereby constituting a powerful force, a privileged social base, at whose service they placed all the expertise of the single party—its cadres, its youth, its networks, its cells—in the service of planned and systematic violence. And they armed themselves for this purpose. The Rwandan state, thanks to the guidance of the French army, considerably increased the size of its armed forces. From 7,000, these grew to 40,000 soldiers, also equipped by purchasing weapons from Egypt and South Africa, with financial guarantees from... Crédit Lyonnais. The transactions were conducted in the simplest way : Rwanda pledged its tea production as collateral, Crédit Lyonnais provided its bank guarantee, and that was that : $6 million worth of arms purchased from Egypt, $5.9 million from South Africa. Thanks to the political and economic guarantee of French imperialism, the Rwandan state thus acquired considerable equipment from Egypt and South Africa, not to mention the weapons supplied by France : mortars, light artillery, spare parts, dozens of Panhard light armored vehicles, troop carriers, and six Gazelle helicopters. And let’s not forget the thousands of machetes ordered by the government. Coincidentally, this was done shortly before the 1994 massacres, and not for agricultural purposes.

In 1994, 30,000 Rwandan soldiers possessed a large quantity of small arms, grenade launchers, landmines, and medium- and long-range artillery. Some of these weapons were distributed to civilians, who formed "self-defense groups." These groups were methodically organized. Even the smallest administrative authority in the country had its own self-defense group, the core of which was called the "Nyumba Kumi." Each such core group, controlled by the authorities, could consist of two or three people and was equipped with a weapon. The "Nyumba Kumi" were grouped into tens, which in turn formed a cell.

These militias, created and organized by the MRND, were called "the Interahamwe," meaning "those who fight together." Their members were recruited from idle youth, the unemployed, and also from army and gendarmerie reservists. The regime’s privileged class, their children, intellectuals, and merchants also contributed their contingents.

These so-called self-defense groups were formed and trained by French and Rwandan soldiers. They were directly under the authority of the Akazu clan, particularly Habyarimana himself, his wife, and their entourage. These were the militias that would later be unleashed against the Tutsis. But well before the genocide, they had been trained to massacre, as in the various RPF attacks, or to assault, kill, or make disappear political opponents and other human rights defenders.

By the end of 1993, under the direction of the state apparatus, all 146 communes of Rwanda were organized into militias. Each, depending on its size, had between 300 and 500 men armed with assault rifles, grenades, and machetes. In the city of Gitamara, there were 50,000 rifles for a population of 144,000.

These militias were not only equipped. They were also trained and seasoned. Galvanized by the dignitaries of power and especially by a radio station, Radio Mille Collines, which, day in and day out, criticized "imported democracy", called for "safeguarding the 1959 revolution" and pointed out the Tutsis as enemies to be eliminated, these men knew what they had been trained for, what work was expected of them, and even who they had to eliminate, because lists of names had been drawn up.

The spring of 1994 of the assassins

This is how, unlike the opposition parties who were so deluded about the negotiations, the Akazu clan, methodically and with the support of French imperialism, prepared itself by recruiting, arming, and developing a formidable killing machine to defend its power and privileges ! And it was also in this way—from above, relying on the State and its resources, and in an organized manner—that they would put their plans into action on April 6, 1994.

Under pressure from the imperialist powers, Habyarimana had finally accepted the Arusha Accords. He had gone to Arusha to sign them and was returning to Kigali that day to promulgate the list of the expanded transitional government that had been imposed upon him. But for the extremists of the Akazu, particularly the leaders of the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic, this was out of the question ! They took their logic to its extreme by shooting down his plane and triggering the massacres that quickly escalated into genocide.

Immediately after the plane crash, they established a military committee led by people like Bagosora, a retired colonel and member of the Hutu clan hostile to any compromise with other parties. While a government already existed in the country, they formed their own within the French Embassy. This government, entirely controlled by the Akazu extremists, was in reality a kind of leadership, a political headquarters from which all the large-scale massacres would be orchestrated.

The so-called "free radio of the Thousand Hills" blamed the Tutsis for the attack. Armed with lists of names and addresses, the death squads then carried out their meticulously planned actions. The first victims were moderate Hutus who had not joined the Hutu Power camp. Some were members of the national unity government or the opposition, which sought a compromise with the RPF ; others were human rights activists or ordinary citizens who, in the name of legality and the existence of a government in the country, refused to be subservient to the military of Akazu’s clan. They were all murdered. The massacres began, in a sense, as a political genocide, with the assassination of some 10,000 Hutu opponents or moderates. Then it was the Tutsis’ turn, particularly the most prominent, wealthiest, and therefore most well-known. Finally, there were the large-scale massacres.

In Kigali, the capital, following calls from Radio Mille Collines urging them to kill, militiamen set up roadblocks on streets, roads, and alleyways. They searched cars and filtered passersby. Tutsis were systematically eliminated with rifles, machine guns, and machetes. Other militiamen raided neighborhoods, searched houses, forced people to denounce or kill their neighbors, and left corpses in their wake. Any Hutus who hesitated or refused to participate in the massacres were killed in turn. No place was spared : offices, schools, and hospitals were transformed into death traps. At the University of Kigali, 87 professors denounced by their Hutu colleagues were murdered by militiamen, while at the hospital, 170 wounded and sick people were slaughtered in their beds, along with all the Tutsi medical staff.

In the towns and villages of the provinces, the militias also acted methodically and in an organized manner. They persecuted and massacred the Tutsis, including in churches. Everywhere, the operations were directed by mayors, town clerks, cell leaders, and priests. Each massacre was preceded by a meeting organized by the local authorities, where the most prestigious national leader spoke. A call was made to "clear the land." Then the local militia went out to "work." It is estimated that 32,000 officials at all levels of the state and administration participated in the massacres, and that the number of killers was between 80,000 and 100,000.

So, is all this ethnic hatred ? Of course not ! As we have just seen, what happened in Rwanda has nothing to do with what some have said or tried to make people believe, namely that the genocide was the consequence of a civil war between two ethnic groups : the Hutus, the majority, massacring the Tutsis, the minority. As horrific as they may have been, the massacres that took place in Rwanda were the result of a political will conceived, organized, and methodically implemented by Hutu dignitaries of the Akazu clan, using the state, its institutions, the army, the police, local authorities, the radio, and even the church. These massacres were prepared, organized, directed, and conscientiously executed by people mobilized and educated for this purpose, who knew what they were doing and why they were doing it.

As for the poor who were drawn into this massacre, including many young people from the lumpenproletariat, tens of thousands followed, but did so passively and, more often than not, under duress. They were isolated, without organization, without any means of resistance. They faced consciously organized and armed assassins. They were given machetes, but the military and the fascist leadership were heavily armed.

Moreover, their victims were not only Tutsis. Many Hutus were murdered by the dictatorship’s armed gangs. Many Tutsis were also protected and hidden by Hutus who refused to participate in these massacres.

Appendices

Although it serves exclusively to justify the policies of French imperialism in this genocide, the report of the "Quilès Commission" is worth reading, as it also contains a number of truths. This report is available online. We quote only the most interesting excerpts here.

Excerpts from the Quilès Parliamentary Report
registered on December 15, 1998
(available online)

“We maintain friendly relations with the Government of Rwanda, which has drawn closer to France after observing Belgium’s relative indifference towards its former colony.” Statement by the President of the Republic, Mr. François Mitterrand, to the Council of Ministers on October 17, 1990.

MILITARY COOPERATION AGREEMENTS

Article 1 of the agreement sets out the conditions under which French military personnel are made available to the Rwandan Government and specifies their mission : “The Government of the French Republic makes available to the Government of the Rwandan Republic the French military personnel whose assistance is necessary for the organization and training of the Rwandan Gendarmerie”.

“French military personnel placed at the disposal of the Government of the Republic of Rwanda are designated by the Government of the French Republic after agreement from the Government of the Republic of Rwanda,” and “they are placed under the authority of the most senior French officer of the highest rank placed at the disposal of the Republic of Rwanda.”
French personnel “serve in Rwandan uniform, with their existing rank or, where applicable, its equivalent within the Rwandan armed forces. Their status as military technical assistants is indicated by a specific “Military Cooperation” badge worn on the left sleeve of the uniform at shoulder level.”

The amendment of August 26, 1992, by replacing in articles 1 and 6 of the 1975 agreement “the Rwandan Gendarmerie” with “the Rwandan armed forces”, extends French military cooperation to all the missions of the armed forces of Rwanda.

THE REASONS FOR FRANCE’S PRESENCE IN RWANDA

In itself, this small, landlocked, overpopulated, and resource-poor African country hardly warranted such intense interest. As Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine emphasized during his hearing, this country “held no particular strategic interest for France… The independence of Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda had not taken place under optimal conditions… These three countries turned to France because it was the only country that still maintained a policy expressing its interest in and friendship for a continent that seemed largely abandoned by other powers.” France’s involvement in Rwanda thus stemmed from the circumstances under which the country gained independence. But it was also essential that Rwanda be French-speaking and a neighbor of Zaire. Geographically, Rwanda shares a border with eastern Zaire, a region immensely rich in mineral resources (uranium, cobalt, diamonds, etc.), and thus offers a privileged vantage point from which to observe developments in this area. Clearly, the beginnings of Franco-Zairian cooperation could not take shape without considering Rwanda and Burundi, which, geographically speaking, constitute a gateway to Zaire and the southern part of the continent for populations from Northeast Africa.

EVENTS IN RWANDA FROM 1990 TO 1994

First, there was a persistent rise in dissent. (…) Historian Gérard Prunier observes that “the political stability of the regime followed almost exactly the price curves of coffee and tin.” This was not a mere coincidence : the same author argues that subsistence farming, the basis of the Rwandan economy, offered little possibility of direct surplus, leaving “for the regime’s elite, (...) only three sources of enrichment : tea and coffee exports,, for a short time, tin exports, and siphoning off international aid. Given that a good portion of the first two sources went to the functioning of the government, in 1988, the decline in revenue left only the third as a viable option.” Hence, competition for positions of responsibility intensified as resources dwindled. (…)

1990

The year 1990 represents a significant turning point in the contemporary political history of Rwanda. The weight of internal factors, both political and economic, should not be underestimated. (…) President Juvénal Habyarimana understood then that he could not escape a political evolution of his regime : thus, while in January 1989 he had emphasized that any political change could only be conceived within the single-party system, his speech of July 5, 1990, marked the acceptance of the principle of separation between the State and the MRND, the only authorized political party, and the recognition of the need for constitutional reforms, based on the establishment of a multi-party system. (…) The evolution of the regime was therefore generating increasing discontent, and this discontent was expressed all the more strongly as the country’s educational level and literacy had improved. The Government, or those close to the regime, attempted to suppress the protests by force. In August 1989, Mr. Félécula Nyiramutarambirwa, a member of Parliament from Butare in the south of the country, was run over by a truck after accusing the government of corruption in road construction contracts. In November of the same year, Father Silvio Sindambiwe, a journalist who spoke freely, was also killed in a “traffic accident.” Journalists who attempted to report on these events were arrested. (…) It was in this context that the Franco-African summit in La Baule took place in April 1990. At the insistence of President Mitterrand, President Juvénal Habyarimana made a declaration in favor of a multi-party system on July 5, 1990. (…) Under these circumstances, the RPF attack on October 1, by demonstrating the President’s regime’s inability to ensure the country’s security on its own, severely weakened his legitimacy. This crisis of legitimacy forced him to deal with his internal opposition and to request increased French military cooperation. (…) Instead of organizing resistance to the RPF in Kigali, a wave of mass arrests was carried out. On October 9, 1990, the Rwandan Ministry of Justice admitted to the arrest of approximately 3,000 people. In fact, the figures are estimated at 10,000. According to Mr. Gérard Prunier, “clearly, these arrests are not targeting RPF supporters (very few in number, and not all known to the police) ; they are striking indiscriminately at educated Tutsis and dissenting Hutus.” (…) The Minister of Defense, speaking on national radio, will ask the population to hunt down the infiltrators. This appeal will be immediately heeded. Some of the defeated RPF soldiers will take refuge in the Mutara region, in northwestern Rwanda. This region is a traditional area of ​​Tutsi emigration to Uganda. However, 348 Tutsi civilians will be massacred there between October 11 and 13, 1990.And more than 500 houses were burned down in the single commune of Kibilira. While this massacre may be of relatively small scale, given the widespread nature of the exterminations observed in the region, its characteristics warrant closer examination. First, none of the victims were RPF fighters ; nor do they appear to have been known sympathizers of the movement : it would indeed have been extraordinarily risky to display such sympathies, and the Tutsis still remembered the persecutions of the period from 1959 to 1962. Second, the massacres were carried out by peasants under the direction of the civil authorities, according to the well-known rules of collective labor. When questioned about the alleged revolt that led peasants in the northwest to massacre Tutsis, President Juvénal Habyarimana calmly replied at a press conference : “This is not a revolt. Everyone is obeying orders.” Furthermore, the local leaders under whose authority the massacres were committed would not be held accountable by the central government. (…)

1991

With the redeployment of political life, a whole series of small parties also emerged between November 1991 and January 1992. Their support can never be measured. In fact, it seems that, for most of them, the aim was to exist as registered parties so they could claim the right to participate in a “national conference,” should one be convened. However, while some of these parties appear to be the product of independent initiatives, such as the Party for Islamic Democracy, the autonomy of many others seems quite questionable. Thus, according to Mr. Dismas Nsengiyaremye, the Rwandan Socialist Party (PSR) and the Democratic Union of the Rwandan People (UDSR) operated in the wake of the RPF. But most were outright instigated by the Rwandan government, anxious to create a sense of numbers and to give voice to similar sentiments around the MRND. (…) As of January 24, 1991, Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert Canovas resumed his role as advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Royal Armed Forces (FAR), a position he held until June 1991, the President of the Republic having once again agreed to extend his mission. On March 21, 1991, the Military Assistance Mission was reinforced by the deployment of 30 soldiers from the DAMI Panda. French military cooperation thus changed scale. The official justification was the concern to prevent “the harmful consequences that the continuation of destabilizing military actions could have for peace in the region.” (…)

1992

On January 8, 1992, demonstrations of unprecedented scale in Rwanda shook the country’s main cities, notably Butare, Gitarama, and especially Kigali, where 50,000 people marched to protest against the new government. Another day of demonstrations was called for January 15, but the authorities banned it, and demonstrators who defied the ban were arrested. However, faced with mounting pressure, President Juvénal Habyarimana eventually agreed to sign a compromise with the united opposition. Under the terms of this compromise, the Nsanzimana government would be replaced by a coalition government. This government, which would include MRND ministers, would nevertheless be headed by a member of the MDR. (…) On April 7, Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye was sworn in, and the new government was formed on April 16, thus crowning the success of the opposition’s unity strategy. (…) The rise to power of the Nsengiyaremye government did not in any way signify a total victory for the opposition. Indeed, while General Juvénal Habyarimana, his entourage, and his party were, for the first time since 1973, forced to share power, they remained active in government. Juvénal Habyarimana remained President of the Republic and Chief of Staff of the army. (…) For many members of the MRND, the opposition’s rise to power and the prospect of negotiations for a power-sharing agreement between the Rwandan Hutu state and the RPF were met with absolute rejection. Thus, in March 1992, a new party appeared on the political scene : the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR). Unlike the smaller parties mentioned above, the CDR would play a significant and largely autonomous role in Rwandan life until the end of the regime. The CDR positions itself as a much more uncompromising movement than the MRND in its opposition to the RPF and the coalition led by the MDR. Its leaders—Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, its founder ; Jean Barahinyura, its Secretary General ; and Martin Bucyana—relentlessly criticize the regime and the MRND for their perceived leniency towards the RPF and those they call its accomplices (“ibyitso,” meaning the opposition parties). It is worth noting that these figures, and more generally those of the radical wing represented by the CDR, are not necessarily the least talented or brilliant figures in Rwandan politics. The Kinyarwanda newspaper “Kangura” (“Wake him up”), run by one of them, Mr. Hassan Ngeze, is remarkably effective politically thanks to its personal attacks against opposition leaders, as corruption and even criminality are not the sole domain of MRND leaders. It is also from among these sympathizers that the majority of journalists for the extremist “Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines” (RTLM) will later be recruited. For many MRND members,The opposition’s rise to power and the prospect of negotiations for a power-sharing agreement between the Rwandan Hutu state and the RPF were met with absolute rejection. Thus, in March 1992, a new party emerged on the political scene : the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR). Unlike the smaller parties mentioned above, the CDR would play a significant and largely autonomous role in Rwandan life until the end of the regime. The CDR positioned itself as a much more uncompromising movement than the MRND in its opposition to the RPF and the coalition led by the MDR. Its leaders—Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, its founder ; Jean Barahinyura, its Secretary General ; and Martin Bucyana—harassed the regime and the MRND for their perceived leniency towards the RPF and those they called its accomplices (“ibyitso,” meaning the opposition parties). It is worth noting that these figures, and more generally those of the radical wing led by the CDR, are not necessarily the least talented or brilliant in Rwandan political life. The Kinyarwanda newspaper “Kangura” (“Wake him up”), edited by one of them, Mr. Hassan Ngeze, is remarkably effective politically thanks to personal attacks against opposition leaders, as corruption and even criminality are not the sole prerogative of the MRND leadership. It is also from among these sympathizers that the majority of journalists for the extremist “Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines” (RTLM) would later be recruited. (…) March 1992 saw the beginning of a series of terrorist attacks. On two occasions, grenades were thrown into the crowd at the Kigali bus station, killing five the first time and one person and injuring 34 the second. (…) March 1992 also marked the resumption of massacres of Tutsis in the provinces. (…) In the Bugesera region, (…) the massacres lasted from March 4 to 9, and resulted in the deaths of an estimated 300 people (the Rwandan administration at the time admitted 182). As in the case of the Mutara massacres (see above), they were carried out by peasants under the leadership of their mayor as part of an “umuganda”. (…) Mr. Filip Reyntjens, author of a report on behalf of the International Federation for Human Rights, writes that : “At the beginning of March, the presence of civilian members of the presidential guard, armed with daggers and pistols, was noted. Furthermore, members of the MRND’s Interahamwe militia were brought into the region in vehicles belonging to the Directorate of Bridges and Roads of the Ministry of Public Works, a department headed by Mr. Ntirivamunda, the President’s son-in-law ; the fuel for the operation was supplied by Séraphin Rwabukumba, the President’s brother-in-law, and by former Minister Joseph Nzirorera, a close associate of the presidential family.” (…) As soon as the extent of the situation became known,The Bugesera massacres prompted an appeal by the ambassadors of OECD countries to President Juvénal Habyarimana. It was reported that the French Ambassador to Rwanda, Mr. Georges Martres, did not participate in this appeal. (…) According to former MRND Defense Minister James Gasana, in a document submitted to the Mission entitled "Political Violence in Rwanda from 1991 to 1993 : Testimony on the Role of Political Party Youth Organizations," it was the MRND that first created its own youth organization, called "Inkuba" (lightning), as early as June 1991, to organize unrest and demonstrations aimed at destabilizing the regime. The "Interahamwe" (those who fight together) were created by the MRND, and the "Impuzamugambi" (those who pursue the same goal) were created by the CDR from its inception. (…) “From mid-1992 onward, the Interahamwe’s decentralization around wealthy political figures allied with Habyarimana’s entourage intensified. Their mobility, coupled with the resurgence of the MRND, allowed them to operate at the national level, particularly for political rallies. Prefectural groups did not form because the prefects feared government disciplinary action. Although the groups created were generally communal, they were established by sector within the Kigali city prefecture and its surrounding areas. Struggles between youth organizations more frequently occurred at the neighborhood level in Kigali city. The proliferation of the Interahamwe around mid-1992 was primarily due to Habyarimana and the MRND’s loss of control of the FAR within the context of the Ukubohoza or Liberation insurrection created by the FDC parties (59).” It is also due to the positioning of certain MRDN figures vis-à-vis their rivals from the same region, within the same party, in the run-up to the general elections. Finally, joining the Interahamwe was a way for criminals to find political protection against prosecution, and for unemployed youth a way to meet their basic needs under the protection of wealthy dignitaries. (…) The first official contacts between the new Rwandan government and the RPF took place just over a month after the inauguration. On May 24, Minister Ngulinzira met with the RPF in Kampala. A negotiation timetable was then established. As early as May 29, just five days after this first meeting, peace talks began in Brussels between the RPF and government representatives from the three parties MDR, PSD, and PL, whose coalition now took the name FDC (Democratic Forces for Change). On June 5, a ceasefire agreement was reached between the RPF and the governing FDC coalition, despite opposition from the MRND. (…) On August 1, the ceasefire came into effect, and on August 18,One month after the start of negotiations for the peace accords themselves, the first memorandum of understanding was signed (in Arusha). (…) The negotiations then entered a second, more concrete phase. This resulted in the signing of agreements on power-sharing within the framework of a “Broad-Based Transitional Government.” These agreements were signed in two stages : on October 30, 1992, for the most general provisions, and on January 9, 1993, for the most difficult parts, notably the specific allocation of ministerial posts and the number of representatives in the Transitional National Assembly. (…) Mr. Gérard Prunier, during his hearing by the Mission, made the following remarks on this point : “in 1992, President Juvénal Habyarimana asked the Minister of Defence James Gasana to get rid of a number of men in his entourage, whom he found unreliable, or even dangerous to him, by marginalizing them or eliminating them from their post (...) among these were Colonels Rwagafilita, Serubuga, Sagatwa, before he changed sides, and Bagosora”. He added that “while James Gasana had succeeded with Colonels Rwagafilita, Serubuga and Sagatwa, he had always failed in the case of Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, who represented the last point of resistance for Madame and her brothers. As long as he remained administrative secretary of the Ministry of Defense, they and their group retained access to that ministry, which they considered absolutely vital, not only for control of the army, but also because the situation was extremely volatile.” In this regard, he observed that “the tenfold increase, in three years, of the army’s size, from 5,200 to 50,000 men, by considerably increasing the defense budget, had equally considerably opened up opportunities for embezzlement, first to finance militias—thus, militias like the Interahamwe or the Impuzamugambi were financed with money stolen from the Ministry of Defense—but also for personal or political enrichment.” (…) Aware of his supporters’ concerns, President Juvénal Habyarimana then attempted to reassure them. That same day, in a radio address, he stated that the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were not given complete freedom in the negotiations and that their initiatives were being monitored. “Our negotiators in Arusha have received instructions… the positions they are adopting are therefore not improvised… That is why I think the Rwandan people can be reassured : every precaution is being taken to ensure that individual actions do not lead our country into an adventure it does not want.” This statement was not enough to appease the anger of some radical Hutus. Following a now well-known pattern, massacres ensued. This time,The events took place in Kibuye Prefecture. According to Mr. Gérard Prunier, the toll was approximately 85 dead, 200 wounded, and over 5,000 displaced. The negotiation and subsequent conclusion of the two agreements of October 30, 1992, and January 9, 1993, were accompanied by growing tension. On October 2, 1992, Belgian professor Filip Reyntjens denounced the existence of a “zero network.” This expression, often interpreted as “zero Tutsi,” (…) The “zero network” was a kind of death squad composed of MRND militiamen and soldiers detached and equipped by the army under the control of those close to the Head of State—that is, the most prominent members of the Akazu. Professor Filip Reyntjens cites Mrs. Habyarimana’s three brothers, the Director of Public Works and son-in-law of the President, Mr. Ntirivamunda, Colonel Elie Sagatwa, the President’s personal secretary and his brother-in-law, the head of military intelligence, the commander of the Presidential Guard, and finally Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense. (…) In the testimony already cited, Mr. James Gasana states that “as early as September 1992, the alliance between the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi was stronger than the Inkuba. Together with the CDR, they formed the political base of the hardliners within the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR). They campaigned among the military for the overthrow of Dismas Nsengiyaremye’s government.” Indeed, on October 18, the CDR organized a demonstration demanding the departure of the Prime Minister and his government, protesting against the government’s shift in leadership, and thanking France for its presence. The demonstrators are also demanding that all registered parties participate in the government. Given what has been said about them, this is clearly an attempt to paralyze government action. (...) Tensions continue to rise. On November 22, 1992, Mr. Léon Mugesera, an influential member of the MRND, addressed activists in the town of Kabaya, in Gisenyi Prefecture, in these terms : “The opposition parties have conspired with the enemy to bring the Byumba Prefecture into the hands of the Inyenzi (...). They have conspired to undermine our armed forces (...). The law is very clear on this point : ’Anyone guilty of acts aimed at undermining the morale of the armed forces will be sentenced to death.’” “What are we waiting for ? (...) And what about these accomplices (Ibyitso) who send their children to the RPF ? What are we waiting for to get rid of these families ? We must take responsibility and eliminate these thugs. (...) We must act. We must liquidate them all !” (...) Mr. Michel Cuingnet, former head of the Cooperation Mission in Rwanda, stated that from the very first broadcasts of RTLM in April 1993, “they were announcing on the airwaves that we had to ‘finish the job and crush all the cockroaches.’ After April 6, 1994,MSF reported that messages like this could be heard on RTLM : “There’s still room in the graves. Who’s going to do a good job and help us fill them completely ?” In fact, these media outlets, which have never been censored or banned, simply relay the statements of regime officials. Eric Gillet reminded the Mission that in a speech delivered in Ruhengeri in November 1992, “President Juvénal Habyarimana called on the Interahamwe militias he had created to support him in his actions and gave them carte blanche.”

1993

Mr. Gillet also quoted Colonel Bagosora, who declared upon returning from Arusha in January 1993 : “I am returning to prepare for the apocalypse.” This desire to eradicate the Tutsis permeated the army, composed entirely of Hutus. General Jean Varret reported to the Mission that “following several attacks, the Rwandan gendarmerie, with the support of the ambassador, had requested training for judicial police officers (OPJ) in order to effectively conduct internal investigations.” (…) Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu, however, offered a slightly dissenting voice, or more precisely, provided additional information. He clarified that “the CDR supporters who were seen publicly chanting, ‘We will exterminate,’ had never said they were only going to exterminate the Tutsis, but that they were also targeting the opposition, which, while it included some Tutsis, was primarily composed of Hutus.” (…) The signing of the second power-sharing agreement on January 9, 1993, further radicalized the situation. First, in accordance with the fears of radical Hutus, the agreements established the allocation of seats in the Transitional Assembly to which the Government would answer. This Assembly would therefore not be elected but appointed. Members of the MRND and the CDR saw this as an intolerable concession to the RPF, which was thus ensuring a significant presence, whereas, given the small proportion of Tutsis in Rwanda, and the fact that many of them were close to the liberal party, elections held immediately would have given it only weak representation. Furthermore, regarding the government, the FDC and PDC parties retained all their ministerial posts. The five posts allocated to the RPF, apart from one newly created position intended to manage refugees, were all taken from the MRND’s quota, which thus lost four of its seats to the RPF, including the Ministry of the Interior. Given the strategic importance of this ministry, the anger of the MRND government and its supporters erupted. On January 19, the MRND and the CDR organized violent demonstrations against the agreement. On January 21, the Secretary General of the MRND declared that his party rejected it outright. The presence of an international commission of inquiry into human rights violations in Rwanda, from January 7 to 21, 1993, had had a definite impact on slowing the violence. Its departure on January 21, at the very moment the MRND rejected the agreement, unleashed their anger. For six days, deadly violence carried out by extremist militias associated with local populations devastated northwestern Rwanda. Here is how Mr. Dismas Nsengiyaremye describes it : “with the support of the local authorities, the MRND organized violent demonstrations throughout the country from January 20 to 22, 1993 and proclaimed its intention to paralyze all activities.The opposition parties were not intimidated and organized counter-demonstrations that neutralized the activists of the MRND and its allies in the prefectures of Byumba, Kibungo, Kigali-city, Kigali rural, Gitarama, Butare, Gikongoro, Cyangugu, and Kibuye (except for Rutsiro commune). In the prefectures of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Kigali rural (Bumbogo and Buliza areas), Byumba (Tumba commune), and Kibuye (Rutsiro commune), these demonstrations quickly turned into riots, and the would-be protesters began killing Tutsis and members of the opposition parties. There were approximately 400 deaths and 20,000 displaced persons.” (…) The escalation of these massacres led the RPF to suspend contacts in Arusha. In fact, on February 8, 1993, it decided to break the ceasefire and launched an attack in the vicinity of Byumba and Ruhengeri. The offensive was successful. The RPF broke through the Rwandan lines, the announcement of peace having largely demoralized the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR). It seized most of their equipment, occupied the greater part of the prefectures of Ruhengeri—a city it conquered on February 8—and Byumba, and advanced as far as Rulindo, 30 km north of Kigali. However, on February 20, the RPF proclaimed a unilateral ceasefire. It seems that two factors may have stopped it. On the one hand, the announcement of the reinforcement of Operation Noroît placed it in a position of risking a direct confrontation with French forces. (…) At the same time, the Government’s loss of control over public order became total. The growth of the militias became uncontrollable. Mr. James Gasana identifies this as one of the consequences of the Byumba offensive : “Despite the actions of the gendarmerie, the Interahamwe continue to grow stronger. The resumption of hostilities by the RPF has driven the population of Byumba towards Kigali, in particular. Thus, thousands of young people, displaced by the war, out of school, without other occupations, embittered, and driven to ethnic hatred by the war, abandonment, and poverty, are being recruited into the Interahamwe to survive. Added to this are also hundreds of soldiers who have deserted the front or who have been dismissed for insubordination.” One must examine the frustration and anger of the thousands of young war-displaced people, abandoned to their fate in the misery and anguish of the camps, to understand the power the Interahamwe will wield in Kigali. In their long ordeal, these young people have faced death in the camps. They have seen hundreds of bodies mutilated by RPF rebel bombs. The victims are either their friends or relatives. Having nothing to lose and desperately seeking a means of survival, they become a recruitment pool for the Interahamwe and are used, along with other young people, in clashes against those they consider allies of the party responsible for their misery, the RPF. The indiscriminate attacks resume.(…) A further and extremely serious step in the disintegration of the state occurred on June 14, 1993, marked by the spectacular and mass escape from Kigali prison of soldiers, Interahamwe members, and individuals involved in the events of December 1992 and January 1993. In his expert report, André Guichaoua notes that “this escape of individuals with very serious criminal records (murders, rapes, looting) could only have taken place with the complicity of the soldiers guarding the prison and the security forces around it.” (…) Links existed between Paul Barril’s group “SECRETS” and the entourage of President Juvénal Habyarimana before the assassination attempt was carried out. These contacts were allegedly established more specifically by certain Rwandan officials to facilitate the proper execution of the arms sale contract signed on May 3, 1993, between the Rwandan Minister of Defense, Mr. James Gasana, and Mr. Dominique Lemonnier, manager of the company Dyl-Invest. Since the Rwandan government never received delivery of the weapons purchased under this contract, despite the payment of a $4 million advance transferred to Mr. Lemonnier’s account, Colonel Elie Sagatwa reportedly tasked Mr. Paul Barril, in November 1993, with overseeing the proper execution of this contract.

1994

On May 20, 1994, Mr. Jérôme Bicamumpaka, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Hutu Interim Government, allegedly granted power of attorney to Mr. Paul Barril to take all necessary steps to recover the advance payment made in November 1993. Having failed to obtain satisfaction, Paul Barril initiated legal proceedings before the Annecy High Court against Dominique Lemonnier, with Mr. Sébastien Ntahobari intervening in these proceedings on behalf of the Rwandan government. Mr. Ntahobari benefited from the assistance of Ms. Hélène Clamagirand, lawyer for Paul Barril’s group and also lawyer for Ms. Agathe Habyarimana following the assassination attempt. This demonstrates the relationships that may have existed between these various parties. All these elements were established by the Mission based on information provided by Mr. Patrick de Saint-Exupéry. (…) Everything points to the fact that the extermination of the Tutsis by the Hutus was prepared months in advance, both ideologically, through the manipulation of the population with the help of the media in particular, and in terms of the instruments of genocide, through the systematic distribution of weapons, the use of caches, and the formation of militias. These facts were essentially known at least since December 1993, as Mr. Eric Gillet recalled during his hearing before the Mission. Mr. Georges Martres considered that the genocide was foreseeable as early as October 1993, “although its scale and atrocity could not have been imagined.” He added that “genocide was a daily fear for the Tutsis.” (…) What struck witnesses at the time, it seems, most at the outbreak of the genocide was, as reported by Mr. Jean-Hervé Bradol, “that it was not a matter of massacres or any kind of popular fury following the death of a president, but rather an organized and systematic process. It was not an angry mob carrying out these killings, but militias acting with order and method.” (…) Ms. Alison Des Forges also believed that “the massacres were unleashed by a very small group that had decapitated the legitimate government in order to seize power.” This small group, composed of committed and organized individuals, “had collaborators in the northwest, in Gisenyi, in the southwest in Cyangugu, in the south-central region, in Gikongoro, and in the east, in Kibungo.” By first targeting individuals who might have opposed the massacres, and manipulating populations through radio messages designed to sow panic, this small group succeeded in controlling almost the entire administrative, military, and political system.“The proof of the centralized nature of this genocide,” according to Ms. Alison Des Forges, is provided by the systematic organization of deceptive staged events designed to prove the imminence of a Tutsi attack and intended to incite hatred among the population against the Tutsis. “The extraordinary efficiency of the genocide machine,” explained Mr. José Kagabo, “would therefore reflect the efficiency of the system of social control under the Habyarimana regime : in each prefecture, a prefect belonging to the party was tasked with organizing the grid system of municipalities, themselves divided into neighborhoods, each neighborhood being subdivided into blocks of ten houses placed under the authority and constant surveillance of a party official nicknamed ‘Mr. Ten Houses.’” Colonel Patrice Sartre and General Jacques Rosier informed the Mission of their impression that the administration, including both prefects and mayors, was seriously implicated in everything that had transpired. The largest and best-organized force, however, remained the Hutu militias “Interahamwe” (those who attack together), close to the MRND, and “Impuzamugambi” (those who share the same goal), close to the CDR, whose numbers were estimated at 50,000 men in April 1994. They were primarily equipped with bladed weapons (machetes, knives, spiked clubs, etc.), but also with firearms, although many French officials noted that their officers had avoided equipping them with such weapons. According to the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel Jacques Hogard before the Mission, the militias targeted the Tutsi civilian population, but also Hutus, provided they did not share their views. (…) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded on April 8 at 10 p.m. : “Given the risks presented by the situation in Rwanda, measures are being taken to proceed with the evacuation of our nationals.” Operation Amaryllis has just been launched unilaterally by France. This intervention, strictly limited in time—it will take place from April 8 to 14—aims to ensure the protection and evacuation of French and foreign nationals. (…) The unique aspect of Operation Amaryllis lies in the request for the “preliminary” evacuation of approximately sixty people, if circumstances permit. Thus, 43 French citizens and 12 members of President Juvénal Habyarimana’s family, including his wife and three children, will depart on April 9 on the first flight, which will take off at 5:00 p.m. from Kigali airport. (…) France has been accused of having, on the one hand, carried out the exclusive evacuation of dignitaries of the Hutu regime without having concerned themselves with the fate of representatives of the moderate Hutu or Tutsi opposition, on the other hand, of having applied different treatment to French embassy staff and Rwandan staff.France did indeed evacuate President Juvénal Habyarimana’s widow, along with two of his daughters, one of his sons, two of his grandchildren, and a few close members of his limited entourage—a group restricted to about ten people, as ordered. Members of the Habyarimana family’s "second circle" were on the passenger list for evacuation on subsequent flights, but these individuals, as has been reported, traveled by road to Gisenyi. (...) The genocide began on the night of April 6, 1994, lasted four months, and claimed approximately 800,000 victims. It was covered up or orchestrated by members of the interim government established after Habyarimana’s death, as well as by military officials and members of the CDR, the MRND, and their militias. A heavy responsibility rests on them, and in particular on Colonel Bagosora, director of services at the Ministry of Defense, Augustin Bizimungu, Minister of Defense, and numerous military and civilian officials who coordinated the genocide. (…) From what date did the international community acknowledge that a genocide was being committed in Rwanda ? The word “genocide” appears for the first time in Resolution 925 of June 8, 1994, which specifies the modalities for implementing Resolution 918. It was only on that day that the Security Council took “note with the deepest concern the reports that acts of genocide had been committed in Rwanda.” Previously, there had been only talk of “widespread violence” (Resolution 912 of April 21, 1994) or “numerous massacres of civilians” (Resolution 918 of May 17, 1994). Utter hypocrisy was reached in the statement by the President of the Security Council on April 30, 1994, in which the Council declared itself appalled to learn of “the massacre of innocent civilians in Kigali and other parts of Rwanda” and referred to “attacks against defenseless civilians.” The word “genocide” was carefully avoided, but its legal definition was nevertheless invoked, as the Council felt compelled to recall that “the elimination of members of an ethnic group with intent to destroy that group, in whole or in part, constitutes a crime under international law.” This is not merely a semantic quibble. The use of the term genocide would have entailed, under Article VIII of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, an obligation for the competent organs of the United Nations to take “appropriate measures for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.” However, the international community, and more specifically the United States, was not prepared for this.Herman Cohen frankly admitted to the Mission that the Americans “long refused to recognize the genocide, in order to escape the legal consequences of such recognition.” It is wrong to believe that the United Nations did not know what was happening ; on the contrary, they knew it all too well, but did not want to acknowledge the reality, preferring to bury their heads in the sand. The UN Secretary-General used the word genocide for the first time on May 4, 1994, in an interview with an American television station, during which he stated, “Here you have a real genocide, in Kigali.” He used it again on May 25, 1994, in a press conference held at the United Nations in New York. But it was only on May 31 that he used it for the first time in writing in one of his reports : “Based on the testimonies gathered, there is little doubt that genocide has occurred, since communities and families belonging to a particular ethnic group have been victims of large-scale massacres.” (…) On June 22, 1994, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur announced to the National Assembly France’s intention to organize a humanitarian operation. He then personally appeared before the Security Council on July 11, 1994, to present the results of the operation. When he addressed the National Assembly, he stated : “The United Nations Security Council will examine, in a few hours, the draft resolution authorizing France to intervene in Rwanda as part of a humanitarian operation to save threatened populations. Why this intervention ?” (…) Operation Amaryllis ended on April 14, Operation Turquoise began on June 22. (…) Operation Turquoise, which took place from June 22 to August 22, differed from previous military operations conducted by France in Rwanda, whether Noroît or Amaryllis. It concerned Rwandans themselves and no longer French or European nationals. It was not part of a State-to-State assistance agreement. Claimed by France, in the name of a moral imperative, it was defined from the outset as a humanitarian operation, placed under a UN mandate. and subject to certain conditions. It is authorized by Resolution 929, which provides for the possibility of using force. (…) Denounced by some as a smokescreen operation actually intended to allow the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and militias to exfiltrate armed into Zaire, with a view to a military reconquest, it has been criticized by others, such as Mr. Jean-Hervé Bradol, for having been by its very nature “a neutral force in a time of genocide”... whereas what was needed was “not a humanitarian operation, which seemed useless to him, but a French or international military intervention to oppose the killers,” since, according to him,The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide clearly applied in this circumstance. (…) Neither the militias nor the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) were systematically disarmed in the Special Security Zone (ZHS). A telegram dated July 10, 1994, states the following regarding this zone : “Unless we wish to provoke widespread reactions against Operation Turquoise, the disarmament of the militias cannot be systematic. It is currently carried out on an ad hoc basis in cases where militiamen threaten population groups.” (…) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded by issuing the following statement : “Given the confirmed presence of members of the Interim Government in the safe humanitarian zone, the French authorities reiterate that they will not tolerate any political or military activity in the safe zone, whose purpose is strictly humanitarian.” (…) However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on July 16 : “We are ready to assist the United Nations in any decisions it may make regarding these individuals (Interim Government), but our mandate does not authorize us to arrest them on our own authority. Such an action could lead us to compromise our neutrality, the best guarantee of our effectiveness.” (…) In an interview given on September 9, 1994, the President of the French Republic, when questioned about France’s support for President Juvénal Habyarimana, replied : “His country was a member of the UN, and he represented an ethnic group that constituted 80% of the population in Kigali. He was recognized by everyone.” Why would there have been a ban ? On the contrary, it was France that facilitated the negotiation between the two ethnic groups.” (…) As Gérard Prunier pointed out during his hearing, “France (…) had indeed trained militiamen who participated in the genocide without having realized – through stupidity or naivety – what their action represented. “(...) In 1993, the recurring question remained whether or not the French army was aware of the formation of militias “derived” from the Rwandan armed forces : the “Interahamwe” militia (of the MRND) and the “Impuzamugambi” militia (of the CDR), formed in 1992, as well as the “zero network” and the “Amasasu” secret society created within the FAR by extremist officers. Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin confirmed most categorically that during the staff meetings he attended, no mention had been made of equipping the militias in his presence.”It is currently practiced on an ad hoc basis in cases where militiamen threaten population groups.” (…) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs responds by publishing the following statement : “Given the presence of members of the Interim Government in the safe humanitarian zone, the French authorities reiterate that they will not tolerate any political or military activity in the safe zone, whose purpose is strictly humanitarian. “(...) However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on July 16 : “We are ready to assist the United Nations in any decisions it may make regarding these individuals (the Interim Government), but our mandate does not authorize us to arrest them on our own authority. Such a task could lead us to compromise our neutrality, the best guarantee of our effectiveness.” (...) In an interview given on September 9, 1994, the President of the French Republic, when questioned about France’s support for President Juvénal Habyarimana, replied : “His country was at the UN, and he represented an ethnic group that constituted 80% of the population in Kigali. He was recognized by everyone. Why would there have been a ban ? On the contrary, it was France that facilitated negotiations between the two ethnic groups.” (…) As Gérard Prunier emphasized during his hearing, “France (…) had indeed trained militiamen who participated in the genocide without realizing—through stupidity or naivety—what its actions entailed.” (…) In 1993, the recurring question remained whether or not the French army was aware of the formation of militias “derived” from the Rwandan armed forces : the “Interahamwe” militias (of the MRND) and “Impuzamugambi” (of the CDR), formed in 1992, as well as the “zero network” and the “Amasasu” secret society created within the FAR by extremist officers. Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin confirmed most categorically that during the staff meetings he attended, no mention had been made of equipping the militias in his presence.It is currently practiced on an ad hoc basis in cases where militiamen threaten population groups.” (…) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs responds by publishing the following statement : “Given the presence of members of the Interim Government in the safe humanitarian zone, the French authorities reiterate that they will not tolerate any political or military activity in the safe zone, whose purpose is strictly humanitarian. “(...) However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on July 16 : “We are ready to assist the United Nations in any decisions it may make regarding these individuals (the Interim Government), but our mandate does not authorize us to arrest them on our own authority. Such a task could lead us to compromise our neutrality, the best guarantee of our effectiveness.” (...) In an interview given on September 9, 1994, the President of the French Republic, when questioned about France’s support for President Juvénal Habyarimana, replied : “His country was at the UN, and he represented an ethnic group that constituted 80% of the population in Kigali. He was recognized by everyone. Why would there have been a ban ? On the contrary, it was France that facilitated negotiations between the two ethnic groups.” (…) As Gérard Prunier emphasized during his hearing, “France (…) had indeed trained militiamen who participated in the genocide without realizing—through stupidity or naivety—what its actions entailed.” (…) In 1993, the recurring question remained whether or not the French army was aware of the formation of militias “derived” from the Rwandan armed forces : the “Interahamwe” militias (of the MRND) and “Impuzamugambi” (of the CDR), formed in 1992, as well as the “zero network” and the “Amasasu” secret society created within the FAR by extremist officers. Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin confirmed most categorically that during the staff meetings he attended, no mention had been made of equipping the militias in his presence.the best guarantee of our effectiveness.” (…) In an interview given on September 9, 1994, the President of the French Republic, when questioned about France’s support for President Juvénal Habyarimana, replied : “His country was a member of the UN, and he represented an ethnic group that was 80% the majority in Kigali. He was recognized by everyone. Why would there have been a ban ? On the contrary, it was France that facilitated negotiations between the two ethnic groups.” (…) As Gérard Prunier emphasized during his hearing, “France (…) had indeed trained militiamen who participated in the genocide without having grasped—through stupidity or naivety—the implications of their actions.” “(...) In 1993, the recurring question remained whether or not the French army was aware of the formation of militias “derived” from the Rwandan armed forces : the “Interahamwe” militia (of the MRND) and the “Impuzamugambi” militia (of the CDR), formed in 1992, as well as the “zero network” and the “Amasasu” secret society created within the FAR by extremist officers. Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin confirmed most categorically that during the staff meetings he attended, no mention had been made of equipping the militias in his presence.”the best guarantee of our effectiveness.” (…) In an interview given on September 9, 1994, the President of the French Republic, when questioned about France’s support for President Juvénal Habyarimana, replied : “His country was a member of the UN, and he represented an ethnic group that was 80% the majority in Kigali. He was recognized by everyone. Why would there have been a ban ? On the contrary, it was France that facilitated negotiations between the two ethnic groups.” (…) As Gérard Prunier emphasized during his hearing, “France (…) had indeed trained militiamen who participated in the genocide without having grasped—through stupidity or naivety—the implications of their actions.” “(...) In 1993, the recurring question remained whether or not the French army was aware of the formation of militias “derived” from the Rwandan armed forces : the “Interahamwe” militia (of the MRND) and the “Impuzamugambi” militia (of the CDR), formed in 1992, as well as the “zero network” and the “Amasasu” secret society created within the FAR by extremist officers. Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin confirmed most categorically that during the staff meetings he attended, no mention had been made of equipping the militias in his presence.”